The Institutional Theory of John R. Commons: Foundation for a Heterodox Labor Economics by Bruce E. Kaufman
ANDREW YOUNG SCHOOL
 O F  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institutional Theory of John R. Commons: Foundation for a 
Heterodox Labor Economics 
 
 
Professor Bruce E. Kaufman 
Department of Economics 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
USA 
Email: bkaufman@gsu.edu 
 
February 10, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
Abstract: Over the last three decades neoclassical economic theory has become the 
dominate approach for the study of labor, most clearly in North America but also 
increasingly in Europe and elsewhere. Rival heterodox approaches, on the other hand, are 
threatened with marginalization, partly due to the imperializing tendencies of neoclassical 
economics and partly due to the inability of heterodox economists to articulate an 
alternative unified theoretical framework. The purpose of this paper is to push forward 
the heterodox project by outlining a theoretical framework and set of core ideas that may 
provide the basis for an alterative paradigm. Toward this end, I re-examine the theoretical 
writings of institutional economist John R. Commons and describe and synthesize his 
theory of institutional economics. Although his theory is general, I focus on its 
application to the study of labor. Key concepts are bounded rationality, property rights, 
working rules, institutions, transactions, and incomplete contracts. I argue that these 
concepts not only form a coherent body of theory but also give rise to numerous insights 
and predictions about labor markets and the employment relationship, highlight crucial 
weaknesses and lacunas in the neoclassical approach, and provide a theoretical 
framework for an integration of the economic and social dimensions of human behavior.  
 
The Institutional Theory of John R. Commons: Foundation for a  
Heterodox Labor Economics  
John R. Commons was a founder of the field of labor economics and was the most 
prominent labor economist of the early twentieth century in North America. He is also 
widely recognized -- along with Sidney and Beatrice Webb of the United Kingdom -- as a 
founder of the field of industrial relations.  Commons’ academic work on specific labor 
and industrial relations topics, such as trade unions, labor management and labor history, 
are regarded as pioneering and continue to be cited. Commons is also generally regarded 
as one of the three founding members of the American institutional school of economics. 
What Commons is not remembered for is the development of theory in labor 
economics, or even in industrial relations (his “extension of markets” hypothesis 
probably being the closest exception). Indeed, the conventional wisdom among 
mainstream economists is that Commons and colleagues were largely fact-gathering 
empiricists who opposed theoretical abstraction and instead practiced an a-theoretic form 
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of “descriptive economics” (Boyer and Smith, 2001). Likewise, the conventional verdict 
on their version of institutional economics is that it lacked any theoretical core and 
instead devolved into a program of criticism and dissent (Blaug, 1997). Even among 
favorably-disposed industrial relations scholars, Commons theoretical writings are rarely 
cited and no theory of industrial relations has been built upon them.   
The idea that Commons was not interested in economic theory, and did not try to 
develop theory, is demonstrably false – at least if “theory” is interpreted more broadly 
than of the orthodox kind. His first book, The Distribution of Wealth (1893), was entirely 
a work of economic theory, and he devoted the last twenty-five years of his life to writing 
three other theoretical treatises: The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (LFC, 1924), 
Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy (IE, 1934), and The Economics 
of Collective Action (ECA, 1950). In the Preface to LFC Commons states, “This work is 
primarily theoretical” and in the first paragraph of IE, he uses the term “theory” (or 
“theories”) three times in motivating the purpose and subject of the book.  
What is a fair matter of debate is whether Commons was successful at developing 
theory. If a discernible intellectual or citation “footprint” in modern economics is used as 
the criteria, the judgment can only be a resounding “no.” Even his admirers (e.g., 
Ramstad, 1995) conclude Commons has had next-to-no influence on the body of 
economic theory and, in industrial relations, the few scholars that cite his theoretical 
works limit themselves to selective quotations (Barbash, 1976, is a partial exception).  
One reason Commons’ theoretical work has borne so little fruit is that it is 
extremely difficult to understand. His books and articles on labor topics are reasonably 
transparent but in his theoretical works the writing style is exceedingly dense, the 
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exposition of ideas cumbersome and unsystematic, and the terminology for key concepts 
often ill-defined and foreign to economists. Frank Knight (1935: 805), one of America’s 
most able economists of that era, stated in his review of IE, “The reviewer, after going 
through the book, could not give a statement of the author’s ‘theory’ …. [even though] I 
have expended much honest effort…. in trying to make out what Professor Commons 
means.” In a similar but modestly more positive vein, Boulding (1957, p. 8) characterized 
Commons’ theoretical works as a “tangled jungle of profound insights.” 
 The contributions of this paper are in two principal areas. First, I endeavor to 
summarize in simple and transparent prose the major ideas and overall framework of 
Commons’ theory of institutional economics. Several other people have also done this 
(e.g., Parsons, 1950; Chamberlain, 1963; Gonce, 1966; Rutherford, 1983; Whalen, 1989; 
Ramstad, 1990; Hodgson, 2003), but my account is nonetheless distinctive for several 
reasons. In particular, I outline Commons’ theory in a way that has more obvious links 
and contrasts to neoclassical theory and derive new ideas, interpretations and implications 
from this theory. Further, I also highlight theoretical and methodological linkages 
between the “old institutional economics” (OIE) of Commons and the two related fields 
of economic sociology (ES) and “new institutional economics” (NIE). Although scholars 
in both fields (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Granovetter, 1991; Streeck, 2005) recognize this 
linkage, it remains obscure and under-developed. Thus, this paper demonstrates that 
concepts central to economic sociology, such as bounded rationality, power, institutions, 
and social structure, are embedded as core parts of Commons’ institutional economics. 
And, lastly, to the best of my knowledge this paper is the first presentation of Commons’ 
theoretical framework with direct application to labor and employment issues. Labor and 
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employment are examined partly because this was Commons’ major area of applied 
research, partly to provide greater focus to the discussion of theory and implications, and 
partly because – as Marx maintained – the wage relation is arguably the most important 
social relation in capitalism.  
The sine qua non of a theory is that it explains or predicts important features of an 
economy and economic behavior. This paper’s second contribution is to demonstrate that 
Commons’ institutional economics qualifies as a theory in this sense; indeed, I argue it 
may well provide the basis for an alternative heterodox economic paradigm. To do so, 
throughout the paper I use Common’s ideas to explain, albeit with brevity due to space 
constraints, numerous features and outcomes of labor markets and the employment 
relationship, as well as omissions and inconsistencies in neoclassical theory. In this 
regard, I argue that in some areas institutional economics and neoclassical economics are 
theoretical complements in that they theorize different dimensions or objects in an 
economy or take different variables as endogenous and exogenous, while in other areas 
they are substitutes in that they consider the same objects/behaviors and give different 
answers/predictions.  
 
Preliminaries: Defining Key Terms 
A fruitful discussion is promoted by explicitly defining several key terms that are 
used throughout the paper.  
The first is neoclassical economics. This term means different things to different 
people, so a common benchmark is helpful. According to The MIT Dictionary of 
Economics (Pearce, 1999, p. 301), neoclassical economics is the following: 
 6
"A body of economic theory which uses the general approach, methods, and 
  techniques of the original nineteenth century marginalist economists… In  
  particular, they studied the possibility of a set of market prices which ensured the 
 equality of supply and demand in all markets. The idea of a perfectly competitive 
  economy in equilibrium, which may be attributed especially to Walras, is central 
  the neo-classical scheme." 
  
The definition offered by Boyer and Smith (2001) in their recent article on the 
neoclassical tradition in labor economics is broadly in this spirit. They state (p. 212), 
“Neoclassical theory [is] a sparse model of maximizing behavior in the face of 
competition and constraints.” They more clearly highlight that a key part of neoclassical 
economics is the axiom of rational behavior, represented analytically by the technique of 
constrained maximization, and then follow the MIT Dictionary definition by also 
emphasizing the second key component, highly competitive markets. The idea that highly 
competitive markets are central to neoclassical economics is further affirmed by Kniesner 
and Goldsmith (1987, p. 1241) who state, “The auction-market analysis of prices and 
quantities is the core of neoclassical economics.” This auction market model of the 
economy is the one pioneered by Walras, and in what follows I refer to it as the “core” or 
Walrasian version of neoclassical economics.  
Of course, neoclassical economists also recognize that many markets are not, in a 
literal sense, perfectly competitive and they have endeavored over the years to broaden 
the paradigm to incorporate a variety of human and market imperfections. Given these 
amendments, the paradigm is still anchored around its most celebrated and fundamental 
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insight – the InvisibleHand Theorem. That is, neoclassical economics takes as its 
fundamental proposition Adam Smith’s assertion that self-interest and competition, 
operating through a system of decentralized and largely unregulated markets, maximizes 
efficiency and social welfare. In this spirit, Edward Lazear (2000) declares (p. 101-102), 
“Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand is a guiding principle in [neoclassical] 
economics…. More formal statements [demonstrate]…. the idea that competitive 
equilibrium is efficient,” while Melvin Reder (1982, p. 11) asserts the central premise of 
the Chicago School of economics (the most famous promoter/defender of neoclassical 
economics) is “the hypothesis that decision makers so allocate the resources under their 
control that there is no alternative allocation such that any one decision maker could have 
his expected utility increased without a reduction occurring in the expected utility of at 
least one other decision maker.” Thus, as used in this paper “neoclassical economics” 
recognizes the existence of human and market imperfections but nonetheless presumes 
that these imperfections are sufficiently spotty and small that the Invisible Hand Theorem 
is empirically valid as a first approximation and a market economy can be modeled “as 
if” it is (mostly) competitive.     
The next key term is institutional economics. According to the MIT Dictionary, 
institutional economics is “A type of economic analysis which emphasizes the role of 
social, political, and economic organizations in determining economic events…. The 
emphasis on the role of institutions is a criticism of conventional economics which may 
be said to ignore the non-economic environment in which individuals make decisions.” 
This definition broadly accords with the statement of Warren Samuels (1969), a leading 
interpreter and expositor of institutional economics, that (pp. 68, 69) “Institutionalists 
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concentrate upon the basic problem of the organization of the economy as a system, 
including the market…. Institutional economics concerns itself with, first, the working 
rules governing the distribution and redistribution of power and which are in various 
ways involved with both psychology and knowledge as bases of social action, and, 
second, with the interrelation of legal and economic processes as a fundamental vehicle 
to comprehend the basic organizational problem in modern society.”  
 All of these facets of institutional economics will be examined in far greater detail 
in what follows, so I eschew further elaboration here. Where additional clarification is 
needed at this point, however, concerns divisions within institutional economics and the 
place of Commons therein. It is common, for example, to distinguish between the old 
institutional economics and the new institutional economics (Furubotn and Richter, 1997; 
Rutherford, 2001). Commons was part of the OIE and is considered one of its three 
founders, along with Thorstein Veblen and Wesley Mitchell. Although the economics of 
these three people are united by certain common principles, there is also considerable 
diversity. Hence, within the OIE are different branches, such as the Texas School 
(Clarence Ayres and followers of Veblen) and the Wisconsin School that follows 
Commons. The institutional economics described in this paper follows the latter but also 
shares important elements with the former. Then there is the NIE, which grew out of the 
work of Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson and others. Some NIE (and OIE) economists 
claim the “old” and “new” branches of the field are largely separate and 
incommensurable (e.g., Ramstad, 1996; Aoki, 2001), and in earlier years a number of 
writers from both camps took pains to disassociate their work from the other. More 
recently, however, writers from both the OIE and NIE have argued that the two research 
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programs share a number of important common points and are thus both part of the same 
intellectual paradigm, broadly conceived (e.g., Medema, 1996; Furubotn, 1997). I not 
only subscribe to the latter view but endeavor to advance it (Kaufman, 2004b).   
 
Commons’ Institutional Economics: Historical Development and Relation to Orthodoxy 
Most contemporary scholars are unfamiliar with Commons’ theoretical work and, 
more generally, the old institutional economics. Thus, appreciation of Commons’ theory 
is greatly aided by first putting it in historical context and juxtaposition to orthodox 
theory.  
The place to begin is to note that, according to Commons, institutional and 
neoclassical economics grow out of the same root and have significant overlap (Biddle, 
1991). The beginning economics text for both paradigms is Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (1776/1937). Commons states, for example, that “I would begin teaching the 
science of economics with Adam Smith” (1934c, p. 1) and that institutional economics is 
a “return to the true spirit of Adam Smith” (LFC, p. 363), while speaking of neoclassical 
economics he remarks (p. 362), “Adam Smith started with a view of the forest but his 
followers lost themselves in the woods.” The “true spirit” of Adam Smith, according to 
Commons, is to take a broad “political economy” perspective on economic science, the 
“forest” that Smith correctly saw (but which in Commons’ view he under-emphasized) 
was the importance of institutions in the form of a “well governed society” (Smith, p. 11) 
to the successful operation of an economy, and the “woods” that Smith’s followers 
became lost in was the tendency to take as a “given” the economy’s social relations and 
institutional framework and examine in ever-finer detail the logic of market exchange.   
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After Smith the two paradigms diverged and followed different paths. The 
seminal figures were Malthus and Ricardo in the early 1800s and their contrasting 
methods and theories. According to Commons (LFC, 4, IE, p. 846), the path that led to 
institutional economics originated with Malthus, while the path to neoclassical economics 
came from Ricardo. The key features of Malthus’ economics are an emphasis on 
imperfect human rationality, the role of institutions (e.g., the church, family, state) in 
regulating individual behavior, the use of empirically-informed premises in theory-
construction, denial of Says Law and the proposition that markets are self-regulating, and 
a policy position open to government regulation of markets in order to balance and 
protect the interests of workers vis a vis consumers (as in the Corn Law debates). 
Ricardo’s economics, on the other hand, was highly abstract and deductively derived 
from a few a priori canonical assumptions, gave a scant role to institutions in the 
economic process, supported free trade and the self-regulating nature of markets, and 
took a strong stance against government interference in markets.  
Commons then traces the evolution of institutional economics though a long and 
varied list of heterodox economists, such as Henry Carey, Karl Marx, the British and 
German historical/social economists (e.g., Gustav Schmoller, Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb), John Hobson and Thorstein Veblen, as well as the legal doctrines of lawyers and 
the Supreme Court and the writings of various scholars in biology, sociology, psychology 
and political science, such as Charles Darwin, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and 
William James. John M. Keynes is also in the institutional (heterodox) camp, broadly 
considered, in that he traced his macroeconomic theory to Malthus and Hobson, claimed 
that a market economy is not self-regulating, and rested part of his theory on human 
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emotions, imperfect rationality, and missing/imperfect institutions (Keynes, 1936; 
Atkinson and Oleson, 1998). Illustrative of the close intellectual kinship between 
Keynesian and institutional economics, Keynes wrote a personal letter to Commons in 
1927 and declared (Skidelsky, 1992, p. 229), “There seems to be no other economist with 
whose general way of thinking I feel myself in such genuine accord.”     
Neoclassical economics, as it developed from Ricardo, went in a different 
direction. Some writers in the classical/neoclassical line, such as Mill and Marshall, 
endeavored to incorporate one or more heterodox elements, such as the historical method 
or importance of institutions. The main current of 20th century neoclassical economics, 
however, as represented in classics works such as Hicks’ Value and Capital (1939), 
Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) and the general equilibrium 
theory of Arrow-Debreu (1954), instead followed Leon Walrás and actively sought to 
minimize or exclude these considerations.  
Illustratively, in Elements of Pure Economics (1874) Walrás distinguishes three 
branches of economic behavior: industry (production), exchange, and institutions. He 
states that industry falls outside of economics as a science, since it largely represents an 
“art” (e.g., the practice of management), while institutions are also disqualified since they 
involve ethical considerations of right and wrong (e.g., as in the creation of law). The 
residual subject is exchange which Walrás argues is best understood using highly 
competitive markets as the model, such as the Paris stock exchange. Thus, he tells readers 
“this pure theory of economics is a science which resembles the physico-mathematical 
sciences in every respect” (p. 71) and “Our task then is to discover the laws to which 
these purchases and sales tend to conform automatically. To this end, we shall suppose 
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that the market is perfectly competitive, just as in pure mechanics we suppose, to start 
with, that machines are perfectly frictionless” (p. 84). In the remainder of the book 
Walrás develops the mathematical model of general equilibrium.  
Several observations are worth noting. First, the Walrasian (core) version of 
neoclassical economics is, in a substantive sense, both institutionally empty and 
institutionally neutral. It is empty because institutions either do not exist (e.g., money has 
no theoretical role, firms are technologically-determined production sets) or are passive 
and exogenously given background factors, such as zero-cost perfectly competitive 
markets, a seamless web of contract law, perfectly divisible and well-defined set of 
property rights, and a government that perfectly enforces them. It is also institutionally 
neutral in that the predicted outcomes are independent of both property rights 
assignments (stated by the Coase theorem) and the form of ownership, such as whether 
property is owned by the state in a Lange-Lerner model of socialist general equilibrium 
or privately owned in an Arrow-Debreu model or, alternatively, whether capital hires 
labor or labor hires capital (Furubotn and Richter, 1997). Second, other important 
considerations, such as the distribution of endowments and income, are also taken as 
exogenous “givens” and, more importantly, are also neutral in that no matter what the 
initial endowment the economy still yields a Pareto optimal set of outputs (as stated in the 
Fundamental Welfare Theorems). Third, people are reduced to individualistic, hyper-
rational “social atoms” (utility functions are independent, people have super-computers 
for brains) whose behavior is unaffected by social rules and norms and respond in a 
passive way to market forces, while labor is modeled as a commodity – albeit one with a 
utility function – that differs in no fundamental respect from the other Xi factor inputs 
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(Prasch, 2004; Swedberg, 2005). And, fourth, the entire system is “mechanistic” in that 
once the assumptions and initial conditions are given the outcome is both logically 
preordained and determined by an unseen force (the invisible hand) that efficiently 
coordinates the action of individuals similar to the way gravity coordinates the sun and 
planets (Mirowski, 1989).  
 The position taken by Commons, if not all institutional economists, is that the 
Walrasian model, and neoclassical paradigm in general, are useful and insightful for 
certain purposes, situations, and questions. Nowhere, for example, does Commons reject 
marginal analysis or calculus-based mathematics (indeed, he used marginal analysis 
extensively in The Distribution of Wealth); rather, his contention is that in some areas of 
economic analysis these tools are inapplicable due to the indivisible, discrete, path-
dependent, or non-quantifiable nature of the economic phenomena. Going further, 
Commons’ general position is that institutional economics and neoclassical economics 
are complements and that the former should build on the useful insights and theories of 
the latter. Thus, he states that “physical sciences have been developed into highly 
mathematical or quantitative expressions, and economic science may learn from their 
important methods of inquiry” (Commons, 1925, p. 6) and “Institutional economics, 
therefore, cannot separate itself from the marvelous discoveries and insights of the 
pioneer classical and psychological [marginal utility] economists” (IE, p. 69). Speaking 
specifically with regard to labor economics, he (1919, p. 17) states “The commodity 
theory of labor …. is not false, it is incomplete.” 
Rather than replacing orthodox economics, Commons claims that the role of 
institutional economics is to give attention to those factors omitted from or taken as a 
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given in traditional theory. Thus, in IE (pp. 5-6) he states, “The problem now is not to 
create a different kind of economics – ‘institutional’ economics – divorced from 
preceding schools, but how to give to collective action, in all its varieties, its due place 
throughout economic theory. In my judgment, this collective control of individual 
transactions is the contribution of institutional economics to the whole of a rounded-out 
theory of Political Economy. ” As this quote indicates, what Commons claims is the core 
of institutional economics is the role of collective action and collective control, as 
exercised through society’s network of institutions in the form of governments, business 
firms, trade unions, families, churches, social norms, etc., in shaping and regulating the 
individual action that is the core focus of neoclassical economics. Illustratively, he states 
“The law of supply and demand is inevitable …. and, like death or the law of gravity, 
cannot be avoided” (IE, p. 101). Yet the job of institutional economics is to “analyze the 
forces and personifications [i.e., institutions and human beings] behind supply and 
demand” (p. 75). Seen in this light, Commons is simply trying to bring back into 
economic theory as active variables what Walrás, Hicks, Samuelson, and Arrow-Debreu 
omit or hold in deep background. It is for this reason that institutional economics may be 
considered a heterodox form of general equilibrium theory (i.e., a theory of how 
institutions coordinate, reconcile and satisfy the conflicting desires of individuals) and 
why it has close intellectual kinship to historical economics, economic sociology, and 
legal economics.  
 At another level, however, institutional and neoclassical economics are more 
clearly substitutes and rivals. Core features of neoclassical economics are methodological 
individualism, a deductive and a priori approach to theory building, the models of 
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economic man (rational actor model) and competitive markets, and the Pareto welfare 
goal of maximum efficiency in resource use. These principles lead to a body of theory 
that is highly individualized, reductionist, a-historical, formalized, universalistic, 
deterministic, divorced from ethical considerations of fairness and social justice, 
protective of both the interests of consumers over workers and the status quo in the 
distribution of social wealth, and opposed to most forms of market regulation. As 
emphasized in more detail shortly, the key properties of neoclassical theory are an 
economy of zero frictions and complete contracts.  
Institutional economics goes in a different direction. It treats the economy not as a 
natural science mechanism but as a social science organism, blends methodological 
individualism and methodological holism (e.g., the idea that institutions are more than the 
sum of individual members and have independent existence), endeavors to build theory 
using a realist/empirically-grounded form of adductive reasoning (adducing cause-effect 
relationships from empirically informed priors), uses analytical tools such as comparative 
institutional analysis, game theory, computer simulations and prose, seeks to develop a 
behavioral/social model of the human agent, introduces other modes of resource 
allocation/coordination besides markets and price (e.g., firms and command), assumes 
most markets are imperfectly competitive, and judges economic performance by an 
expanded welfare function that gives explicit weight to efficiency, equity, and human 
self-development (Ramstad, 1986; Jacoby, 1990; Kaufman, 2004a). The resulting theory 
gives a “socialized” view of economic behavior; is multidisciplinary, evolutionary, 
historically and culturally contingent, and more difficult to analytically represent; 
contains indeterminateness at key places; and provides space for a positive role for 
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institutional intervention in the economy and social reform. All of these features are also 
part of theorizing in the modern field of economic sociology (Smelser and Swedberg, 
2005), while at the same time Commons gives more emphasis to the formal rules and 
institutions surrounding markets than does economic sociology (Streeck, 2005).   
In terms of policy, Commons version of institutional economics leads to the 
conclusion that capitalism is the best available economic system, since it promotes 
efficiency, innovation, and personal liberty better than alternative systems, but 
nonetheless is subject to significant market imperfections, coordination failures, and 
forms of social injustice that collectively lead to waste, inefficiency, and inequity. It was 
for these reasons that Commons (1934b, p. 143) described his life work as an institutional 
economist as an effort to “save capitalism by making it good;” a project that required him 
to develop an alternative economic paradigm to support and legitimize social reform 
(e.g., the New Deal and development of the modern welfare state) given the status quo, 
laissez-faire, and pro-consumer/anti-producer slant of orthodox theory (Thurow, 1988; 
Jospeh Stiglitz, 2000, p. 3, who bitingly remarks on this matter “it might seem as if the 
fundamental propositions of neoclassical economics were designed to undermine the 
rights and position of labor.”) Thus, in institutional economics the invisible hand of free 
markets must be supplemented and sometimes replaced by the visible hand of 
coordination and reform by the state and other institutions, leading to what Commons 
calls a “managed equilibrium” (IE, p. 120) and in more recent times forms of 
“coordinated capitalism” (Streeck and Yamamura, 2001). The necessity of a managed 
equilibrium, in turn, arises from two key assumptions in institutional economics: an 
economy of positive frictions and incomplete contracts.   
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Viewed in this manner, neoclassical and institutional economics are substitute 
paradigms in that their specific methods and theories are largely opposites. In this 
respect, Douglas North (1984, p. 7) states that neoclassical economics “ignores the costs 
of trade” and thus “is really half a theory.” Institutional economics incorporates the costs 
of trade and thus provides the other half. Yet, broadly viewed, they are also complements 
in that each explores different dimensions of the economic problem and highlights 
different aspects of economic behavior. Given this duality, I turn to a more detailed 
exposition of Commons’ theory of institutional economics.  
 
An Outline of Commons’ Institutional Theory   
 I now proceed to a more detailed explanation of the major parts of Common’s 
theory of institutional economics. His theory has both a microeconomics and 
macroeconomics component, but the former is the more fundamental and is focused on 
here. Where possible, I also endeavor to indicate linkages between Commons, Keynes, 
and ES and NIE.    
 Commons states that the science of economics “deals with the problems of 
mankind as they go about trying to make a living or to get rich. Thus the economists are 
interested primarily in the problems which arise from the production of wealth and the 
distribution of income” (ECA, 21). This conception views economics as a study of the 
formation and operation of an economy, where an “economy” is a system of people and 
institutions that provision society with goods and services.  -- a view parallel to that of 
Coase (1994, p. 41) who states that economics studies “the working of the social 
institutions which bind together the economic system.” It partially incorporates but 
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remains significantly different in scope from the conception of Lionel Robbins, Gary 
Becker and other neoclassical economists that economics is the study of how to 
efficiently allocate scarce resources (i.e., the best means to a given end). The 
Commons/Coase conception, it may be noted, appears closer to the viewpoint of Adam 
Smith, who states that political economy can be “considered as a branch of the science of 
a statesman or legislator” [i.e., how to construct an economy using legal rules and 
institutions] with the purpose of discovering methods that “enrich both the people and the 
sovereign” (p. 397).  
 As with Smith and practically all economists, Commons (IE, p. 6) claims that 
the starting point for a theory of economics is the condition of scarcity. The core 
Walrasian version of neoclassical economics proceeds to analyze how people overcome 
scarcity through the operation of the invisible hand in competitive markets. Commons 
central point, and the starting-off place for institutional economics, is the observation that 
the assumptions made in this theory take for granted or assume away many of the most 
problematic and difficult parts of the actual operation of an economy. In particular, 
Walrasian theory assumes that there exist perfectly defined property rights, perfectly 
enforced contract law, pre-existing and zero cost markets and other supporting 
institutional infrastructure, and perfect information and perfectly rational people. The 
combination of perfect people in perfect markets inevitably leads to the best of all 
possible outcomes, as enshrined in the Invisible Hand Theorem, and a negative verdict on 
all interferences with market processes. As earlier stated, Commons accepts this theory as 
providing certain useful insights and implications, particularly of a conceptual and long-
run nature. But he also maintains that this theory has only small relevance to 
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understanding the actual operation of economies, particularly in the short-to-medium run, 
because it omits all the imperfections and frictions that are endemic to any human 
endeavor. Thus, what is required is an alternative economic theory that takes as a base-
line the operation of the economy with imperfect people in imperfect markets regulated 
by imperfect governments. As Coase (1994, p. 18) puts it, “realism in assumptions forces 
us to analyze the world that exists, not some imaginary world that does not,” and in a 
similar vein Steven Cheung (1988, p. 516) states, “Transaction-cost economics is real-
world economics.”  
 Institutions. In this spirit, Commons (IE, p. 4) claims that the three 
fundamental challenges facing humankind in overcoming scarcity are resolving conflict, 
dealing with interdependence, and creating civic order. That is, in an imperfect world 
with material scarcity people inevitably come into conflict over control and use of 
resources, opening the possibility that theft, predation and violence displace mutual-gain 
production and exchange (i.e., that “take” displaces “make” and “buy”). Likewise, an 
economy requires that people work together, cooperate and respect each other’s property 
and personal rights, yet distrust, opportunism and fraud can quickly undermine these 
things. And, finally, an economy requires a transparent, honest, and strong government 
that impartially administers the laws and effectively maintains civic order, yet 
governments are easily corrupted, the laws subverted to enrich special interests, and 
lawlessness and criminality allowed to run rampant.  
 Walrasian economic theory obviates these problems by the assumptions it 
makes, but in Commons’ institutional economics – and economic sociology in the 
tradition of Durkheim and Weber -- they are the key issues that must be resolved for 
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successful production and exchange to take place. But how are the problems of conflict, 
interdependence and order to be solved? According to Commons, the answer is human-
made institutions.  
 An institution, as defined by Commons, is a particular regime or body of 
working rules. Others have framed this idea as “rules of the game” and “regimes (or 
modes) of regulation” (Furubotn and Richter, 1997; Boyer and Saillard, 2002). In 
particular, he defines an institution as, “collective action in control, liberation, and 
expansion of individual action” (ECA, p. 21). Examples of working rules are laws, court 
decisions, corporate charters, business firms’ human resource policies, trade union 
constitutions and collective bargaining contracts, social norms and cultural conventions, 
religious doctrines, ethical principles, and custom. Every human-made entity or 
organization, called a going concern by Commons, is governed by a body of explicit and 
implicit working rules and its behavior and performance are guided and structured by 
these rules. This idea is carried forward into the NIE by Williamson (1985) who labels 
the working rules the governance structure of economic organizations (p. 15). The 
importance of working rules goes beyond formal organizations, however, for they 
structure and regulate all forms of ongoing social behavior between human beings. In 
other words, human interaction is always and everywhere “instituted” -- or “socially 
constructed” (Granovetter, 1991, p. 76). 
 Commons proceeds to note that all of these working rules, both formal and 
informal, establish property rights (or simply “rights”) in the sense that they give 
individuals control over scarce resources. Property (ownership) rights, he says, are “rights 
to scarcity” (ECA, p. 165) and define “all the activities which individuals and the 
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community are at liberty or required to do or not do, with reference to the object claimed 
as property” (IE, p. 74). Importantly, the object claimed as property may be not only a 
material object but also a financial instrument (stock, bond, etc.) or intangible item, such 
as a claim to a job, access to a market, a political liberty, a human right, or a social 
convention (e.g., the right to be treated with respect). Commons (ECA, p. 21) states that 
“In modern capitalism the most important stabilized economic relations are those of 
private property” and for this reason “ownership becomes the foundation of institutional 
economics” (IE, p. 5).  
 The focus on property rights and ownership in institutional economics 
differentiates it from the traditional price theory version of neoclassical economics. In the 
latter, for example, property rights and ownership are taken as a given and then the 
theorist works-out how the process of production and exchange, operating through the 
laws of supply and demand, determine prices, outputs, and the allocation of resources and 
income. Commons says (IE:56-57), for example, “It was assumed that all commodities 
were owned, but the ownership was identical with the physical thing owned, and 
therefore was overlooked as something to be taken for granted. The theories were worked 
out as physical materials, omitting property rights.” Thus, in the neoclassical theory of his 
day demand was derived from the behavior of marginal utility as people consume 
additional physical units of a good; supply was derived from the behavior of marginal 
cost as additional physical units of factor inputs are added to production, and a market 
equilibrium is reached when price balances demand and supply. Property rights and the 
political sovereignty of the state are omitted as active explanatory variables and all 
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economic relations in competitive markets are relations between individuals and things 
(i.e., human independence rather than interdependence).  
 Institutional economics, on the other hand, is inevitably political economy 
because it focuses on the nexus between law and economics, the central role of the state 
in forming and enforcing the legal regime, and how the politically determined rules of the 
game affect economic behavior and performance (and vice versa). In this respect it is 
complementary to James Buchanan’s concept of “constitutional economics” (Vanberg, 
1997), the French school of régulation theory (Boyer and Saillard, 2002), and the German 
school of ordo-liberalism (Grossekettler, 1989). Since economics and law are inextricably 
intertwined, institutional economics at both a positive and normative level is also a study 
of ethical economy since law is inescapably based on considerations of intent, justice, and 
right and wrong and effectively regulates economic behavior only to the extent 
participants maintain an ethical commitment to observe the rules of the game. And 
furthermore, institutional economics is also a study of evolutionary economy since the 
corpus of working rules that structures the economy and molds individual preferences 
continuously changes over time (Biddle, 1997; Hodgson, 1999). The change in the rules, 
in turn, is guided by human purpose, thus in Commons’ view making economic evolution 
a process of “artificial selection” rather than the “natural selection” and an ongoing 
process of “cumulative causation” as attainment of one set of ends gives rise to a new set.  
 Given the focus on rules, power (i.e., ability to satisfy one’s preferences) is also 
a central construct in institutional economics, as it is in economic sociology (Dobbin, 
2005). Power, for example, is exercised by some person(s) when they create and enforce 
the working rules, and power is also exercised by the people who participate in selecting 
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these leaders. The working rules furthermore define each economic agent’s opportunity 
set, endowments, and rights and conditions for exchange of property, thus effectively 
determining their relative bargaining power and resulting income and command over 
goods and people. Ultimately, therefore, it is political power, not the impersonal forces of 
supply and demand, that determines whose interests count in the economy and who reaps 
the rewards and bears the costs of economic activity (Samuels and Medema, 1997; 
Schmid, 1987). While political government possesses the ultimate power in society, 
many other groups and organizations also possess a measure of sovereignty and hence 
create and enforce their own working rules. Commons (ECA, p. 74) speaks of a 
“hierarchy of governments,” such as business firms, labor organizations, churches, and 
families. Also included are “invisible” institutions, such as custom and culture. These 
institutions enforce their rules through a mix of physical, economic, and moral sanctions, 
such as imprisonment, loss of job, excommunication, and feelings of shame. A firm, 
therefore, is not only a production function but also a political governance system that 
invests certain people (the “boss”) with power over others, gives certain people but not 
others (e.g., shareholders but not workers) the right to choose new leaders, and 
establishes working rules that distribute economic opportunity and bargaining power 
(e.g., rules governing job assignment and promotion, employment-at-will versus just 
cause dismissal).   
 In one respect, institutional economics simply seeks to highlight and flesh-out 
the institutional “superstructure” of rules and property rights that create the choice sets 
and incentives that Walrás and other neoclassical economists tend to treat in a highly 
simplified and a priori manner. In doing so, institutional economics usefully calls 
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attention to the fact that ownership (property rights) is antecedent to all else in 
determining how an economy performs. Thus, the very existence of a market economy 
depends on whether the state permits private property, while the existence and size of 
firms likewise depends (in part) on rights of ownership and costs of transferring 
ownership. Going further, every significant theoretical construct in orthodox economics, 
including commodities, utility functions, production functions, efficiency, demand and 
supply curves, and market price, are not well-defined or operable unless and until there is 
a well-defined set of property rights. It is entirely appropriate, therefore, to talk of an 
“institutional theory of price,” for price cannot exist without the supporting infrastructure 
of institutions, and price only takes the value it does given the specific regime of working 
rules. Likewise, economic policy is always and everywhere “institutional” since it 
necessarily involves expanding some people’s rights and curtailing the rights of others 
(Samuels and Medema, 1997). 
 The focus on ownership and property rights does more, however, than simply 
highlight factors neoclassical economics has historically neglected or taken as a given. In 
certain respects, economic theory and its conclusions are fundamentally changed. This is 
revealed by taking a deeper look at core processes of choice, production, and exchange 
that form the heart of economics.  
Choice and the Human Agent. Two intellectual propositions have been most 
central to institutional economics: first, the claim that the neoclassical “model of man” is 
defective and should be replaced and, second, that “institutions matter” in determining 
economic outcomes. The first of these has earned institutional economics a reputation for 
dissent and criticism, epitomized by Veblen’s (1898, p. 389) satirical critique of 
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economic man as a “lightning calculator of pleasures and pains.” Satire and realism aside, 
it is the case that purely based on theory and logic rejection of the economic man model 
is a necessary condition for the validity of the second proposition – that institutions 
matter. Hence, I turn to consideration of the human agent and the process of choice.  
The process of choice is fundamental to institutional economics. Commons 
observes that in a world of scarcity people must choose one course of action over another 
and decide how vigorously to pursue it. He states that this choice process is “the all-
inclusive foundation of modern economics” (ECA, p. 39). Thus, both institutional and 
neoclassical economics have a theory of choice, entailing in turn a model of the human 
agent. But the specific aspects of this theory of choice and model of the human agent are 
where the two paradigms diverge.  
 The model of the human agent used in neoclassical economics is the rational 
actor model (“economic man”). Operationally, the rational actor model means the 
constrained maximization of a well-ordered preference function. Its key properties are 
(among others) maximization, transitivity, completeness, and continuity. Importantly, all 
of these assumptions take the form of a priori assumptions posited by economic theorists 
and are not developed or justified with respect to theories or evidence from psychology. 
Indeed, Samuelson (1947) declares the desired goal is to as much as possible take 
psychology out of economics. 
 The methodology of institutional economics (particularly the OIE version) is 
different. Institutionalists practice deductive reasoning, but believe the power of 
deductive reasoning is enhanced when it proceeds from empirically informed priors. With 
regard to the model of the human agent, an adductive methodology means that 
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institutionalists seek to develop a model of the human agent that is informed by the 
theories and evidence from the behavioral sciences (psychology, sociology, 
anthropology). Coase (1984, p. 231) framed the challenge as “start[ing] with man as he 
is.” This area of inquiry is now known as behavioral economics, and is also the approach 
advocated in economic sociology (Smelser and Swedberg, 2005).  
Like Walrás, and also drawing from the legal literature, Commons talks about 
human behavior and choice in terms of the “human will.” Where he differs from Walrás 
is in the specific model of the human will. From Commons’ perspective, Walrás removes  
the human will from economic theory as an active element since it mechanically reacts to 
changes in external stimuli (e.g., changes in budget constraints), thus making economics 
akin to physics. The fact that economic man also knows the relevant information set (at 
least in probabilistic terms) and can calculate optimal solutions is also central to deriving 
equilibrium outcomes. Commons’ strategy is to accept certain parts of the neoclassical 
human agent but then revise and add to them in ways that are more congruent with theory 
and research in social psychology. The result is to shift economic theory from a closed to 
an open system model, replace static equilibrium with dynamic process, and introduce 
behavioral elements that lead to allocative inefficiency and macroeconomic coordination 
failures. Out of this conjunction of events is born, in turn, the need for institutions to 
supplement and supplant the market.  
Parts of the orthodox model Commons accepts, at a broad level, are 
maximization, utility, self-interest, and rationality. He defines utility, for example, as “the 
satisfaction a person gets in using a thing” (LFC, p. 20) and then says regarding 
maximization “Each transaction is economic in that each individual is endeavoring to 
 27
make the largest possible use, for his own purposes, of his limited resources” (LFC, p. 
129). Of firms he states (IE, p. 526) “the sole motive which dominates them is profit.” 
With respect to self-interest, Commons (IE, p. 799) remarks, “We may assume, with 
Adam Smith, that everybody seeks his own self-interest, regardless of the effects on 
others, in all his economic activities….This consists of getting as much gain as possible 
and suffering as little loss as possible.” And part of what competition and capitalism 
force people to do is engage in “purposeful thinking” (LFC, p. 360), which can be 
regarded as synonymous with rationality.  
Now come the differences. While Commons accepts the utility construct, he 
endeavors to give it psychological content. Thus, while utility in orthodox economics is a 
disembodied ordinal preference relation, for Commons (LFC, p. 20) utility is a “feeling” 
and therefore an experienced emotional state such as happiness, satisfaction, or subjective 
wellbeing. In today’s terminology, the neoclassical version is “decision utility” and the 
institutional version is “experience utility” (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997).  
Treating utility as equivalent to (say) happiness leads to a number of implications 
and predictions absent from orthodox theory (Kaufman, 1999a). For example, the 
empirical literature in psychology finds that happiness is fundamentally tied to 
interpersonal (relative) comparisons. This suggests utility functions should be modeled as 
interdependent, preference relations are “social,” and behavior is affected by fairness, 
envy, and other emotions engendered by comparisons with others. Status-seeking and 
“keeping up with the Jones,” for example, was highlighted by Veblen (1899) as a key 
driver of behavior and the capitalist system. Thus, while neoclassical economists tend to 
dismiss institutional concepts such as “conspicuous consumption,” “fair wages,” and 
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“orbits of coercive comparison” as ad hoc because they do not fit into their individualist 
model of man, from an institutional point of view these are entirely logical and well-
founded concepts and it is the neoclassical version that is substantively mis-specified 
(Solow, 1990). Likewise, while neoclassical economists typically assume preferences are 
exogenously given and either uniformly or randomly distributed, Commons argues that 
people have “institutionalized minds,” meaning that preferences are endogenously shaped 
by their environment (e.g., culture, advertising, etc.) and vary in systematic ways across 
social classes and groups (Hodgson, 2003; Weber and Dawes, 2005).  
While Commons accepts the general principle of maximization, it also needs 
qualification. For example, constrained maximization is impossible to analytically carry-
out or realistically practice in the face of fundamental uncertainty (i.e., when even 
probability distributions are unknown). Thus, when fundamental uncertainty bulks large 
or significant in economic choice, it may be better scientific method to model decision 
making using an approximation procedure, such as a convention, trial and error, rule of 
thumb, or some form of satisficing procedure (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Gigerenzer and 
Selten, 2001). Likewise, while Commons appears (in the quote above) to give blanket 
endorsement to the neoclassical proposition that firms solely maximize profits, his 
support is actually circumscribed because he early-on (Commons, 1919, pp. 47-8) 
recognized and discussed the problem of principle and agent in firm governance and 
economic contracting. Thus, as made famous by the institutonalists Berle and Means 
(1932) and Galbraith (1966), there may occur a “separation of ownership and control” in 
the firm, causing managers to pursue other goals than profit maximization.     
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Commons also amends the orthodox model of human rationality. Behavior and 
choice are rational, but only within bounds. Thus, Commons (IE, 874) advocates a model 
of what Herbert Simon (1982) later called “bounded rationality” on the grounds that 
rational choice is significantly constrained by “passion, stupidity, and ignorance.” [Simon 
(1982, p. 449) states that Commons was one of his sources for the bounded rationality 
concept.] Today these factors are called emotional affect, limited cognitive ability, and 
imperfect information. Commons gives great stress to the role of emotions in 
disrupting/distorting rational choice, particularly from feelings of fear, insecurity, and 
injustice. He says, for example, “Let anarchy surround him… and he reverts at once to 
animal fears that crowd out reason with its entire scheme of rights and duties… When his 
rational expectations are gone the savage in him takes possession” (LFC, p. 364). For 
similar reasons he states “of all human emotions… injustice is the most destructive” (p. 
366). The implications are that rationality is to some degree a learned form of behavior, 
cannot always be exercised because of cognitive and information limitations, and can be 
seriously disrupted (and, paradoxically, sometimes improved) by strong emotional states 
(Kaufman, 1999b).  
Another element of bounded rationality is imperfect information. Commons 
follows Knight (1921), Austrian economists, and post-Keynesian economists in this 
regard and stipulates that the decision maker faces an environment characterized by a 
significant amount of fundamental uncertainty. Thus, he (IE, p. 107) states that 
institutional economics “investigates how our own minds and the world around us 
actually behave in a society of human beings whose future is frankly recognized as 
unpredictable but which can be controlled somewhat by insight and collective action.” 
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Fundamental uncertainty precludes, in turn, a closed system economic model and 
equilibrium solutions.  
Commons also introduces qualifications into economists’ treatment of self-
interest. First, while orthodox economics typically exalts the positive function played by 
self-interest via the invisible hand, Commons notes that in a world of imperfect 
information and property rights self-interest can easily turn into a destructive and anti-
social force as people engage in cheating, lying, and misrepresentation. In the NIE 
Williamson (1985) models this dark side of self-interest as “opportunism.” The second 
qualification Commons introduces is to note that human beings also have other “self” 
motives and needs besides self-interest. An example stressed by Adam Smith is self-love, 
while others are self-esteem, self-actualization, self-efficacy, and self-worth. These other 
self motives in part shape the direction self-interest takes (e.g., self-love and self-esteem 
cause people to spend much effort and resources to maintain and advance their relative 
position in organizations and society), while in some cases these motives lead to behavior 
that are difficult to explain with orthodox theory. An example is internally motivated 
behavior (Kaufman, 1999a). 
Internally (intrinsically) motivated behavior arises where people pursue a line of 
activity for its own sake or due to some internally generated drive, such as for self-
realization or the thrill of discovery/accomplishment. In neoclassical utility theory, 
behavior is extrinsically motivated because it arises from the pursuit of utility 
(satisfaction) residing in external objects and ceases once the optimal allocation or 
configuration is achieved. Such behavior, indeed, is essential to the entire notion of 
equilibrium, as is represented by the stable tangency position between a budget constraint 
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and indifference curve. One reason institutional economists such as Commons find the 
equilibrium concept of limited applicability is precisely because people demonstrate 
considerable amounts of intrinsic motivation, causing them to pursue activities and goals 
with no equilibrium resting point or even direct relationship to externally specified 
benefits or costs.  
As an example, Commons (IE, 874; Gonce, 1976) praised the entrepreneur as a 
key actor in economic growth, noting that these people are partly motivated by profit but 
also by an internal drive to accomplish and create in the face of a fundamentally 
uncertain future. Thus, while neoclassical theory emphasizes maximizing static efficiency 
through marginal decision rules and an optimal equilibrium allocation of resources, 
institutional (and Austrian) economics emphasizes the dynamic process of growth that 
comes from entrepreneurship and the development of new products, processes, and 
technologies – developments not well suited to marginal analysis nor best stimulated in 
many cases by an allocatively efficient perfectly competitive market. Also important to 
growth are the character of the people and the legal and institutional framework (Soto, 
2000), while the amounts of labor and capital emphasized in neoclassical production 
function studies are of secondary importance.   
Exchange, Coordination, and Production. This institutional model of the 
human agent is crucial for the logical development of the next theoretical component, the 
processes of coordination, exchange, and production. I start with exchange. 
Because of division of labor and specialization, people become interdependent 
and must engage in exchange to acquire the necessities of life. A task for economic 
theory, therefore, is to model this process. The way orthodox economics does this is to 
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model the exchange process as taking place through markets. Markets may take many 
forms, but the base-line or core version is a competitive market. The two sides of the 
market are represented by a demand curve and supply curve and these establish the 
equilibrium price and quantity. The quantity variable is usually specified as the amount of 
some good or service per time period; the price variable is market-determined and 
coordinates demand and supply.  
 Commons modifies this model in several important respects. To start, he notes 
that on deeper analysis it is not physical units of some good and service that are 
exchanged but the rights of ownership to these goods. Thus, he (ECA: 45, emphasis in 
original) observes “When the manufacturer sells his shoes, or the farmer sells his wheat, 
it becomes a ‘commodity,’ meaning anything that is bought and sold. But he does not sell 
the shoes, he alienates his ownership of the shoes, and he does not sell the wheat, he 
transfers its ownership….Prices are paid, nor for physical objects, but for the ownership 
of objects.” Coase (1988a, p. 656) makes the same point when he says that what are 
traded on markets are not physical goods but rather “bundles of rights, rights to perform 
certain actions.” 
 When orthodox theory puts the Q (quantity) variable on the horizontal axis of 
the demand/supply diagram, it is implicitly assuming a condition of zero transaction cost 
and, hence, a regime of complete contracts, for only with complete contracts will the 
property rights traded in the market exactly match the goods and services (including 
money and other credit instruments) the buyer and seller deliver to each other. A contract 
is complete “when it is possible, at the moment of signing, to foresee all the 
circumstances that could arise while it is still in effect, and to set out verifiable clauses 
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for each of them” (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, p. 308, emphasis in original). Complete 
contracts and zero transaction cost (to be defined shortly) are crucial to the invisible hand 
conclusions of the neoclassical model because only then do market prices accurately 
reflect opportunity costs, all margins on exchangeable goods are priced, all gains from 
trade are realized, and conflict is obviated. Stated another way, complete contracts are 
what makes exchange frictionless and timeless and thus allows Walrasian theory to be 
institutionally empty and neutral. It is for this reason, as earlier noted, that a model of 
“imperfect man” is a prerequisite for a meaningful institutional economics.   
 In Commons’ model, decision-makers have imperfect information and bounded 
rationality and confront an external environment with important elements of fundamental 
uncertainty. Hence, all contracts are necessarily incomplete and a potentially large gap 
opens between the property rights the buyer and seller agree to exchange and the 
quantities and values that are actually delivered. Incomplete contracts, in turn, permit a 
host of market failures and sources of inefficiency in exchange. With incomplete 
contracts and poorly specified and partitioned property rights, for example, some markets 
will be missing and others will set prices through small numbers administration and 
bargaining. Likewise, externalities will be rife and, indeed, arise in every exchange 
(Schmid, 1987). Numerous other contracting problems unknown to the Walrasian world 
of perfect competition also emerge, such as principal-agent problems, moral hazard, non-
cooperative bargaining, and hold-up effects. In labor markets, incomplete contracts and 
the human nature of labor also make supply and demand curves interdependent -- a 
change in the price of labor affects employee work effort and shifts the labor demand 
curve and with referent-dependent preferences the labor supply curve also shifts (Slichter, 
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1931, p. 626) -- and render the former ill-defined (to be explained). Without a well-
defined demand and supply curve, the core of the neoclassical model loses coherence. 
 Incomplete contracts also forge a link between the economics of Commons and 
Keynes at key points and help explain business cycles and non-market clearing outcomes 
(Atkinson and Oleson, 1998). The fundamental reason flexible wages cannot eliminate 
unemployment, argued Keynes (1936, p. 11), is because workers can only bargain about 
money wages in a capitalist labor market, but it is real wages that determine the demand 
for labor – implying unemployment may persist because of a missing institution, while he 
noted that in practice money wages are rigid downwards because of workers’ concern for 
their relative wage position (p. 14) Also, with contractual incompleteness economic 
agents have a need for a human-made institution called “money” and it is the existence of 
money, along with the separation between real and nominal magnitudes that contract 
incompleteness allows, that causes business cycles (IE, p. 892). Contract incompleteness 
also means that expectations of the future (what Commons calls “futurity”) are crucial 
since economic agents agree to exchange property rights today but in many cases only 
reap the benefits and bear the costs months and years in the future. Since people are 
emotional and boundedly rational beings, their expectations reflect “animal spirits” and 
collective moods of pessimism and optimism, making prices and expenditures both more 
volatile and non-correcting. These considerations, along with the general institutional 
proposition that the economy should be modeled as an unfolding process, means that 
economic theory should be constructed in real time – a proposition also fundamental to 
post-Keynesian economics (Davidson, 1994).  
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 Economic theory, of course, needs a way to conceptualize and model all of 
these “frictions.” Toward this end, Commons invented the concept of a transaction. 
According to Commons, a transaction is the fundamental unit of measurement in 
institutional theory. He defines it as “a legal transfer of ownership” (IE, p. 55). He goes 
on to say (p. 58, emphasis in original), “Transactions, as thus defined, are not the 
‘exchange of commodities’ in the physical sense of ‘delivery,’ they are the alienation and 
acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of future ownership of physical things, as 
determined by the working rules of society.” 
 Having defined the transaction as a transfer of legal ownership, Commons 
distinguishes three types of transactions: bargaining, rationing, and managerial.  They are 
differentiated on the basis of the manner in which ownership rights are transferred.  
 The bargaining transaction is made by legal equals (if not economic equals) 
who exchange or trade property rights and ownership interests through voluntary 
agreement. Typically this occurs through markets and prices reflect the terms of trade. 
Bargaining transactions are the hallmark of a capitalistic market economy.  
 Rationing transactions (or “administrative transactions”) are the product of 
command between a legal superior and legal inferior. A rationing transaction takes place 
when (ECA: 48), “either the quantity or the price, or both, are determined by some 
superior power.” The superior power Commons had in mind is some unit of government, 
such as when a dictator issues a unilateral command, a legislature passes a law, or a court 
issues an edict that in some respect transfers property rights from one person or use to 
another. A centrally planned economy relies on rationing transactions to price and/or 
allocate resources, as do individual capitalist firms in making their internal resource 
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allocations (suggesting firms can be viewed as a microeconomic version of central 
planning). 
  The managerial transaction takes place within firms and other institutions 
devoted to the creation of wealth. In broad form it is similar to a rationing transaction 
because it transfers ownership through command and vests a legally superior person with 
the ability to order a legally subordinate person to do the former’s bidding (within limits). 
The managerial transaction occurs, for example, when the entrepreneur uses other 
people’s purchased labor as a factor input in production. In this sense, it is coterminous 
with Williamson's (1985) concept of "hierarchy" (an organization with a "boss" and one 
or more subordinates). For purposes of production, an inanimate factor input can be 
directly utilized and the entrepreneur's property right in it gives him/her authority to 
extract as much "use value" from it as possible. When the firm purchases labor, however, 
in a world of incomplete contracts it gains a property right only to an ill-defined and 
highly variable amount of labor power embodied in a human being (an insight Commons 
got from Marx). Thus, when an employee is hired the transfer of ownership of labor 
power is still incomplete and one more transactional step is required before the firm gains 
the labor power it needs to commence production. This transfer of labor power from 
worker to firm is the "managerial transaction," and is accomplished by use of orders, 
rules and regulations, functional business specialists (e.g., human resource managers), 
supervisors, and various rewards and penalties.  
 Notice should be given to the fact that Commons has substantially broadened 
the orthodox theory of exchange. Exchange of property rights in neoclassical economics 
takes place through markets and is coordinated by price; in Commons’ institutional 
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economics exchange it takes place (principally) through two institutions – markets and 
hierarchial organizations, and is coordinated by two mechanisms – price and command. 
[Schmid (1987) notes that property rights can also be exchanged as a unilateral grant.] 
This conceptual dichotomy is clearly evident in Commons’ statement at the beginning of 
IE (p. 7), “All that Communism, Fascism, or Nazism needs to abolish historic capitalism 
is to abolish bargaining transactions and to substitute for them the managing and 
rationing of a planned economy.”  
 If there are alternative methods for exchanging property rights, the question 
immediately emerges: which mode is preferable, and under what conditions? In other 
words, the choice of market versus hierarchy becomes an endogenous variable, rather 
than an exogenous variable as in neoclassical economics. The key insight of Coase, and 
the central theoretical proposition of NIE, is that the choice of transactional mode turns 
on the relative cost of making the transactions; that is, on transaction cost. This insight, 
and its conceptualization, is the strategic part of institutional theory that Commons did 
not work out and is where the NIE makes a fundamental contribution. Paradoxically, 
however, although Commons never explicitly defined the concept of transaction cost, 
such a definition is implicit in his work and represents, I believe, an analytically superior 
version to that developed by Coase, Williamson and others in the NIE.  
 To get to Commons’ version of transaction cost requires one other distinction. 
He differentiates between proprietary (exchange) and production (engineering) sides of 
the economy (IE: 251-59). A transaction is a social "man-to-man" relation because 
property rights are socially created and transferred between people, while production is a 
physical "man-to-nature" relation because the services of physically-constituted factor 
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inputs are transformed into outputs via a technologically determined production function. 
Thus, the acts of production and transaction are separable and orthogonal -- a transaction 
is by definition the process by which an entrepreneur trades or otherwise acquires 
ownership rights to factor services (and sells the ownership rights to the newly created 
goods and services); production is the process in which an entrepreneur transforms factor 
inputs already owned into new forms of material wealth (use values). In practice, the 
dividing line between the managerial transaction (the separation of labor power from the 
worker and transfer to the employer) and the use of this labor power in production is 
difficult to distinguish. 
 With this distinction in mind, Commons’ theory directly leads to a definition of 
transaction cost. Since a “transaction” is a legal transfer of rights of ownership, 
“transaction cost” is the cost of the resources used up in effectuating this transfer of 
ownership rights. Transaction cost is thus intimately connected to the costs of contracting 
and, in particular, arise at each of three stages of the contracting process (ECA:53): the ex 
ante costs of negotiating the contract, the drawing-up and execution of the contract, and 
the ex post performance and enforcement ("administration") of the contract. Evidently, 
the only way for complete contracts is to have zero transaction cost, leading to the 
conclusion that a basic dividing line between Walrasian (orthodox) and non-Walrasian 
(heterodox) economics is the divide between zero and positive transaction cost for the 
former is an institutionally empty economy of self-regulating competitive markets and 
the latter is a mixed economy of imperfect markets and “non-markets” (firms, etc.) that is 
not self-regulating and thus requires managed coordination and control.   
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 This definition of transaction cost is broadly similar to that proffered by Coase 
and Williamson -- i.e., (paraphrased) ex ante and ex post costs of contracting (Coase, 
1988b: 6; Williamson, 1985: 20). However, Commons’ schema maintains a clearer 
separation between production cost and transaction cost. Transaction cost is the value of 
the real resources used to effectuate a transfer of ownership rights, production cost is the 
value of the real resources used up in the production of a good or service once ownership 
rights to inputs have been obtained. Williamson, by way of contrast, defines transaction 
cost to also include intra-firm exchanges of goods and services (those already owned by 
the entrepreneur). From a legal perspective this confuses physical “delivery” with transfer 
of ownership, from an economic perspective it mixes production and transaction costs.  
 With this definition of transaction cost, we can now return to the choice of 
transactional mode. In the NIE this is frequently framed as the choice of “make versus 
buy.” In neoclassical economics exchange is assumed to take place through markets and 
the endogenous variables are the equilibrium price/quantity. Institutional economics, 
however, recognizes that transactions may take place outside of markets. A classic 
illustration is when a firm decides to vertically integrate, thus taking a transaction out of 
the market and internalizing it within the firm (suggesting that the size and existence of 
markets is, in part, a choice variable of firms). Commons' model provides a 
microeconomic decision rule for determining the "make versus buy" vertical integration 
decision and, also, a macroeconomic explanation for when societies will choose a “make” 
economy of central planning versus a “buy” economy of market capitalism.   
  Regarding the vertical integration decision, Firm A can either make a good or 
service in-house or buy it from Firm B, whichever entails the least cost. The cost of the 
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"make" option is per unit production cost (including a normal profit), PCA, and 
managerial transaction cost, MTCA. The cost of the "buy" option is the product price 
charged by Firm B, reflecting its production and managerial transaction cost and any 
above-normal profit margin, and also per unit bargaining transaction cost, BTCA from 
using the market. Thus, the "make" option is preferred if PCA + MTCA < PCB + MTCB + 
BTCA. (I assume competitive product markets, so Firm B earns only normal profit which 
is included in PCB). If transaction cost is zero in both dimensions, the decision is 
"neoclassical" in that "make versus buy" turns solely on relative levels of production cost 
between the two firms. If both firms have identical production cost structures, Firm A 
will choose the "make option" as long as its managerial transaction cost (or, more simply,  
"management cost") is less than the sum of the market transaction cost and Firm B's 
management cost. Although not explicitly shown above, the “make” option of integration 
can also be motivated by the prospect of monopoly profit on the part of Firm A. 
 At a macroscopic level of comparative economic systems, Commons’ theory 
also provides an explanatory framework for “make versus buy.” He distinguishes 
between an economy of “extreme individualism” and “extreme collectivism.” In an 
earlier article (Kaufman, 2003), I have suggested these terms can be thought of as two 
endpoints in economic organization. Extreme individualism, or “perfect 
decentralization,” is an economy organized at the lowest possible level of disaggregation 
– that is, a “buy” economy composed solely of one person production units, such as an 
economy of family farms or one-person firms, where the division of labor is entirely 
coordinated by price and intermediate goods and factor inputs are acquired through 
bargaining transactions. The polar opposite is “perfect centralization” where the economy 
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is organized as one giant “firm” (a “make” economy) and the division of labor is entirely 
coordinated by command and all intermediate goods and factor inputs are produced (or 
reside) within the organization and are acquired through rationing and managerial 
transactions.  
 The model of perfect decentralization corresponds to a Walrasian competitive 
general equilibrium economy; the model of perfect centralization corresponds to a 
socialist centrally planned economy. Based on Commons’ ideas, I have developed a 
“periodic table” that identifies the five fundamental variables (decision-making, utility 
functions, production functions, property rights, and sovereignty, along with the degree 
of complementarity and non-separability within and among them) that determine all 
forms of economic organization.  
 For example, where decision-making is perfect (perfect human rationality and 
information) and property rights are perfectly divisible, tradable, and enforced, the 
economy is one of perfect decentralization; where decision-making is perfect but 
property rights are completely indivisible and non-tradable the economy is one of perfect 
centralization. The former is characterized by zero bargaining transaction costs and is 
coordinated by an omniscient auctioneer, the latter is characterized by zero rationing and 
managerial transaction cost and is coordinated by an omniscient central planner (or 
nation-state “CEO”). Ultimately, the key decision variable in determining the form of 
economic organization is whether private property rights exists and can be traded, thus 
supporting Commons’ contention that government (or “sovereignty”) and the rules issued 
by the institution of government concerning property rights are the most fundamental 
determinant of economic activity. Seen in this light, economics spans both market and 
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non-market forms of economic organization, includes both the subjects of markets and 
management and the theories of price and administrative coordination, rests 
fundamentally on rules about ownership, and is always and everywhere “political 
economy” and “institutional economy.” Likewise, in real world economies that have both 
positive bargaining and rationing transaction cost, the economy is neither all price 
coordinated nor all command coordinated but some combination of the two, yielding 
different forms of a mixed economy. Concrete examples of this type of institutional 
theory in operation are the literatures on “employment systems” (e.g., Marsden, 1999) 
and “varieties of capitalism” (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001), and the role that “institutional 
complementarities” play in giving rise to a small number of discrete institutional forms 
(Aoki, 2001; Höpner, 2005). Similarly, positive transaction cost and asset specificity (a 
technological form of complementarity) explain the formation and structure of internal 
labor markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Williamson, Wachter and Harris, 1975).   
 Descending to a lower level of analysis, Commons’ theory of institutional 
economics also provides new ways of conceptualizing and understanding markets and 
firms.  
 It is a fair statement that neoclassical economists simply assume markets and 
firms exist and spend little time inquiring into the institutional infrastructure of these 
entities (Streeck, 2005). Abolafia (2005, p. ix) notes, for example, that the most important 
reference work in economics, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Eatwell, 
Milgate, and Newman,1987), quite astoundingly has no entry on “markets.” This type of 
a priori treatment of fundamental constructs led Coase (1988, p. 3) to lament that what 
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we have in economic theory is “consumers without humanity, firms without organization, 
and even exchange without markets.”  
 First consider in more detail markets. Markets do not exist in nature but are 
human-made institutions that require real resources to create and operate. Furthermore, 
markets operate only in the context of a body of working rules that determine the nature 
of the good or service being exchanged, the pool of potential traders and conditions of 
entry and exit, the procedures governing interaction between buyers and sellers and what 
methods and practices can and cannot be used, and the sanctions used to enforce 
obedience to the rules. In this spirit, Coase (1992, p. 718) declares in his Nobel address,  
“It makes little sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange without 
specifying the institutional setting within which trading takes place, since this affects the 
incentives to produce and the costs of transacting.” 
 The importance of this perspective can be appreciated by considering the 
neoclassical theory of price determination. As noted earlier (the quote of Kniesner and 
Goldsmith), the theoretical heart of neoclassical economics is the model of auction-type 
competitive markets. An auction market, however, does not emerge out of thin air; rather, 
it is an example of what Alfred Marshall (1920, p. 326) called a “highly organized 
market,” such as the New York Stock Exchange or Chicago Board of Trade, and 
functions only because of specially-created rules and institutional infrastructure . For 
example, rules establish the precise characteristics of the products traded (e.g., No. 2 
winter wheat); a central exchange is created that coordinates buying and selling and 
announces prices akin to Walras’ auctioneer; the central exchange separates buyers and 
sellers so they are anonymous and make offers and bids based solely on price; and 
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institutions are created that quickly disperse information to buyers and sellers and 
minimize the costs of transacting. The result is real world markets that closely 
approximate the textbook model of pure competition, which is to say a situation where 
prices clear the market and quickly rise and fall in reaction to changes in demand and 
supply. Indeed, price volatility in highly competitive markets is so pervasive that 
additional institutions called “futures markets” are typically created in order to keep 
speculation from becoming destabilizing.   
 The question, of course, is whether many or most real world markets resemble 
auction markets in structure and performance – not necessarily in terms of every 
descriptive detail but as a reasonable first approximation. Empirical evidence suggests the 
answer is no with regard to structure, and that this makes a large difference in terms of 
performance (Abolfafia, 2005). The reason is because most markets lack the central 
institution crucial to an auction market – an intermediary organization between buyers 
and sellers that collects the bids and offers and sets the parametric market-clearing price. 
If no such exchange exists, then some other institution, set of rules, and process has to set 
the price (or wage). In most markets, this function is performed by business firms, 
although often supplemented and in some cases supplanted by bargaining and negotiation 
(Robinson, 1978). In the markets for cars, restaurant meals, and movies, for example, 
firms choose the price and present it to buyers on a “take it or leave it” basis, as they do 
with wages in labor markets. This fact suggests that these firms face downward sloping 
demand curves in product markets and upward sloping supply curves in labor markets, 
implying prices and wages are not parametric but subject to choice. A variety of market 
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imperfections, however, create room for higgling and thus the posted price (or wage) may 
be closed through an implicit or explicit form of bargaining (as in many auto sales).  
 Several implications flow from these observations. First, most prices (including 
wages) are administered prices and are thus set to maximize the interests of the 
institution that sets them (firms). These prices sometimes allow room for negotiation, 
however, and the final price in these cases is also a bargained price. Thus, one may assert 
that the core of neoclassical microeconomics is the theory of market-determined prices, 
while the core of institutional economics is the theory of administered/bargained prices. 
Second, while administered/bargained prices are undoubtedly constrained (perhaps 
greatly) by market forces, the fact they are set by firms or through bilateral bargaining 
means as a general premise that they are neither market-clearing nor very flexible 
(witnessed by the absence of futures markets for labor and most goods). Third, prices can 
only be completely market determined if there are zero transaction costs, while they take 
on some element of an administered/bargained price whenever transaction cost is 
positive. Fourth, the model of a perfectly competitive labor market is logically 
contradictory since it presumes zero transaction cost but in this situation a labor market 
will not exist since firms hire all labor services from independent contractors in product 
markets (Coase, 1937). Fifth, this dividing line between zero and positive transaction cost 
also determines when the familiar diagram of price determination by supply and demand 
can exist as a meaningful (well-defined) theoretical construct. The reason is that a well-
defined market supply curve only exists in a perfectly competitive market (derived as the 
sum of the marginal cost curves of the individual firms), while in an imperfectly 
competitive market individual firms have no well-defined supply curve, as demonstrated 
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in most elementary economics textbooks for the case of monopoly. By similar reasoning, 
a well-defined labor demand curve and market-determined wage cannot be derived for an 
imperfectly competitive labor market (Fleischer and Kniesner, 1980, p. 198). Given the 
ubiquity of transaction costs, institutionalists (e.g., Tool, 1991, p. 21) would agree with 
the contention of Joan Robinson (1933) that the neoclassical penchant to treat perfect 
competition as the general case and monopoly as the special case should be reversed 
(where monopoly is broadly defined).  
 These implications about price theory are not stated per se in any of Commons’ 
theoretical works. It is evident, however, in his discussion of bargaining transactions that 
he assumes the general case is one of imperfect competition, partly because he assumes 
markets are characterized by a range of indeterminateness in offers and bids (e.g., IE, 59) 
and partly because he lays great stress on the role of strategic interaction in price setting 
(called “negotiational psychology”, IE, p. 90; Biddle, 1990). What is more important, 
however, is the general observation that the power of a theory is to generate cause-effect 
statements and empirical hypotheses and, given the implications noted above, by this 
standard Commons has indeed presented us with a theory of generality and substance.    
 Commons’ institutional perspective also yields interesting and often non-
neoclassical insights and predictions about the theory of the firm and theory of 
production.  
 As a generalization, neoclassical theory treats the firm as a production function, 
assumes the goal of the firm is maximum profit, assumes deterministic and downward 
sloping marginal revenue product (factor demand) schedules, postulates that firms 
operate at (or gravitate toward) an equilibrium output level where marginal revenue 
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equals marginal cost (MR=MC), that market forces pressure firms to operate on their 
efficiency frontiers, and firms have no power over employees. None of these 
propositions, however, are acceptable or likely to be valid as a general case from an 
institutional perspective.  
 The firm, from Commons’ perspective, is an institution or governance structure. 
The operation and performance of firms, like markets, thus has to be understood in terms 
of the rules that structure them and the goals of the people who develop and enforce the 
rules. The first casualty of this observation is the neoclasscial a priori and universalistic 
profit maximization assumption. Viewed as a governance structure, the objective function 
of every organization, be it a firm or a labor union, is determined through a political 
process in which the governance rules and distribution of property rights (e.g., 
endowments and power) determines whose interests count. When the firm is owned and 
managed by one person and operates in a largely competitive environment, it is 
reasonable to assert that the goal of the firm is maximum profit. But, when owners (e.g., 
shareholders) are highly dispersed, the firm is effectively run by the salaried managers, 
and particularly in cases where markets have significant imperfections, the governance 
structure is such that the managers have some discretion to pursue their self-interested 
goals – goals which may include maximizing growth or size, maximizing executive 
compensation, or enjoying the “quiet life.” Today this idea has moved into mainstream 
economics under the aegis of principle-agent theory but whether it is internally consistent 
with the core of neoclassical economics is less clear (to be discussed later).  
 Other core parts of the neoclassical theory of the firm are equally compromised 
when put under the lens of institutional economic theory. For example, the theory of the 
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firm postulates a well-defined and downward sloping short-run marginal product 
schedule for labor, deduced as a solely technological phenomenon attainable from adding 
more units of labor to the production function. Institutionalists (e.g., Lester, 1964; Dow, 
1997) object to this on two grounds: first, it treats labor as similar to capital, land, and 
other inert commodities when labor is actually embodied in living human beings and, 
second, it again assumes zero transaction cost and complete contracts when such do not 
exist in the real world. The result is the managerial transaction has a significant element 
of indeterminacy that has to be closed through bargaining, human resource management 
practices, punitive measures (e.g., threat of termination), and other devices. The reasons 
are, first, that – as Marx first emphasized -- labor power is volitionally supplied by 
workers, depending on their morale, feelings toward the employer, interest in the job, 
etc., unlike the determinate amount of BTUs or RAM that goes into the production 
function from every unity of homogenous coal or computers. Thus, in the usual diagram 
the marginal product of coal or computers is determinate and can be drawn as a well-
defined downward-sloping schedule, but the marginal product of labor is highly variable 
and can only be assumed to yield a determinate schedule if the volitional capacity of 
labor is omitted or, alternatively, the employer and employee are assumed to negotiate a 
complete and fully enforced labor contract ex ante to production (so that that workers 
supply the agreed-upon amount of labor power contracted for in the wage bargain). As 
nearly all neoclassical economists (e.g., Stigler, 1952, p. 200) admit, however, human 
work effort is highly variable and employment contracts are notoriously incomplete.      
 In addition to these lacunas, the standard theory of the competitive firm is able 
to generate an equilibrium short-run output level by assuming production is subject to the 
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law of diminishing returns so that at some point there is a MR=MC equilibrium. The 
problem, from an institutional perspective, is that the law of diminishing returns is 
(again) postulated as an a priori assumption and is almost never subjected to empirical 
verification. From an institutional perspective, the law of diminishing returns is not a 
universal phenomenon, at least over a large part of the relevant range of production, but 
rather applies as a useful first approximation to only a subset of production situations 
(e.g., farming). Thus, institutionalists insist on empirically informed priors and when they 
examine the empirical evidence on the behavior of production cost they find that in many 
lines of production marginal and average variable cost curves are horizontal or declining 
until close to the technical full capacity level of production (Lee, 1998). A principal 
reason, in turn, is that the marginal analysis underlying neoclassical economics has 
validity only as long as economic relations are divisible, while significant aspects of cost 
are indivisible (e.g., joint costs, team forms of production, fixed costs, all of which can 
lead to some version of increasing returns) and thus have the “collective” aspect (as 
opposed to “individualistic” or divisible aspect) emphasized in institutional economics. 
The implication is that setting MR=MC may not be an operationally viable decision rule 
for a firm and, hence, they determine short-run output (and employment) using an 
alternative procedure (Lester, 1946). One test of these alternative theories is to ask: 
would most real world firms be willing to produce more output if they could sell it at the 
going price? The neoclassical theory of the firm answers “no” (since doing so would by 
logical implication reduce profit) while institutional theory answers “most likely yes.” 
Similarly, the fact that most workers are not indifferent to being laid-off or fired (as they 
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would be with a horizontal labor supply curve to the firm) also suggests that labor 
markets do not operate at a competitive market-clearing position.   
 Another distinguishing difference between neoclassical and institutional 
economics concerns the linkage between efficiency and equity. As Stiglitz (2000) notes, 
the central tenet of the Fundamental Welfare Theorems of neoclassical economics is that 
issues of distribution (equity) can be separated from issues of efficiency. Thus, Walrasian 
theory asserts that the inequality of initial endowments, or distribution of market rewards, 
does not affect the ability of a perfectly competitive economy to generate the Pareto 
optimal level of output. The reason is that economic agents are modeled as self-interested 
individualists (utility functions are independent) and, thus, issues of fairness and 
distribution do not affect individual behavior (per the observation of Rees, 1993, p. 243, 
that “the neoclassical theory of wage determination…. has nothing to say about 
fairness”). It is a central tenet of institutional economics, however, that economic agents 
are social beings and that considerations of fairness and equity are ever-present. If this is 
the case, the effort provided by workers in production is a positive function of perceived 
equity (e.g., procedural and distributive justice), creating a link between efficiency and 
fairness. Further, Commons contends that if market rewards are viewed as unjust then the 
economic players at some point refuse to honor the rules or even play the “game,” 
creating not only inefficiency but also the possibility of sabotage and rebellion. Thus, he 
asserts that prices cannot be at a long-run equilibrium unless they also pass the test of 
reasonable value. That is, market endowments, processes, and outcomes must be widely 
perceived as falling within the limits of fairness or otherwise they will be changed 
through collective action, leading to further changes in prices. For this reason institutional 
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economists contend that considerations of fairness and social justice must be introduced 
into economics on purely positive (theoretical) grounds since economic behavior is 
strongly influenced by both. 
 Finally, an implication of neoclassical theory is that employers have no net 
power advantage over individual employees since, in a competitive labor market, they 
can easily quit and seek work elsewhere. Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 777) claim, for 
example, that the firm “has no power of fiat, no authority ….Telling an employee to type 
this letter rather than file that document is like telling a grocer to sell me this brand of 
tuna rather than that brand of bread.” But, from Commons’ perspective, this 
characterization is highly inaccurate. Many workers face substantial constraints on 
mobility because external labor markets are imperfect, separation from internal labor 
markets entails significant costs, and the law explicitly gives the employer authority to 
tell the worker what to do (within limits) and the right to terminate the worker “at will” 
for non-compliance.  
 Social Welfare Objectives. I wish to end the overview of Commons’ 
institutional economics with a very brief discussion of social welfare objectives.  
 Commons was not a classical liberal nor a European-style social democrat but a 
“social liberal.” He sought maximum liberty for individuals, but this liberty had to be a 
“positive liberty” where people had not only minimalist constraint on satisfying their 
preferences (“the “negative liberty” of classical liberalism) but also a reasonable degree 
of power (i.e., resources, as made available by rights) to actually attain them (Fried, 
1998). It was for this reason that he advocated unemployment insurance and, more 
radically, a right to some form of gainfully-earned income, on the grounds that “Free will 
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is illusory if it does not end in free action, and free action is impossible where society has 
not yet overcome the hard physical facts of necessity” (Commons, 1899, p. 135). 
Similarly, he favored voluntary employer initiatives and market solutions to social 
problems (IE, p. 875), but employers and markets had to induce action by “persuasion” (a 
choice based on attractive alternatives, such as good wages and hours) rather than 
“coercion” (a choice compelled by lack of good alternatives, such as induced by hunger 
and fear of joblessness).  
 The existence of (unreasonable) coercion in economic exchange, in turn, 
provided the institutionalists with an intellectual rationale for rules that abridge freedom 
of contract, such as a minimum wage law and union contract, for the courts had long held 
that coerced contracts are null and void. In this spirit Commons and Andrews declare 
(1936, p. 372), “the inequality in withholding power between employer and employee is 
so great [due to unequal property rights, market imperfections and substantial 
unemployment] that the term bargaining is a misnomer,” and then continue (p. 373) “The 
need for collective bargaining arises from the serious discrepancy in ‘withholding power’ 
between the individual employer and the individual wage earner, a discrepancy which 
tends to result in terms of employment highly oppressive to the worker and injurious to 
society as a whole…. It is a case of the necessities of the laborer pitted against the 
resources of the employer.” While from a neoclassical perspective collective bargaining 
in a competitive labor market results in “monopoly wages” and resource misallocation, 
from an institutional perspective the tilted legal rules of the game (e.g., laws permitting 
unrestricted immigration but high tariffs on imported goods) may so favor the interests of 
capital that labor as a class nonetheless suffers from a form of “institutional exploitation” 
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(Taylor, 1977). So viewed, collective bargaining increases the wage closer to what would 
prevail with more balanced (“competitive”) rules and rights (Kaufman, 2004d).  
 Starting from this ethical position, Commons became a labor economist early in 
his career because he saw that labor markets were the site of the worst coercion in 
capitalism; in the 1920s he became one of the nation’s leading monetary economists 
because he saw that demand-deficient unemployment was the worst cause of economic 
coercion and monetary stabilization was the best solution; and throughout his career he 
advocated expanded collective bargaining, protective labor legislation and social 
insurance programs as a way to balance bargaining power, provide economic security 
(regarded as people’s greatest economic desire) and give workers voice in the operation 
of industry (Gonce, 1976; Whalen, 1993, Kaufman, 1997). Stated another way, 
Commons believed in capitalism and free markets but both have to be fair, balanced, 
democratic and humane to attain and keep ethical legitimacy (Budd, 2004). To achieve 
these conditions, in turn, required that he set aside neoclassical economics, given its 
laissez-faire orientation and defense of existing economic outcomes (which serve the 
self-interest of the rich and powerful who have preponderant influence in setting the rules 
of the game) and become an institutional economist who actively seeks to change the 
rules of the game to achieve the aforementioned goals.  
 Given this ethical orientation, the next step is derivation of a more formal social 
welfare function with which to evaluate alternative economic outcomes. Neoclassical 
theory uses the criterion of efficiency or Pareto optimality. An outcome is efficient when 
resources have been allocated such that it is impossible to make one person better off 
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without harming another person. Personal benefit and harm are measured in terms of 
individual preference relations, usually defined over alternative consumption goods.  
 Commons and fellow institutionalists advocate an expanded social welfare 
function. Dispute exists about the precise nature of the institutional social welfare 
function (see Samuels, 1997), but I outline what I interpret Commons’ position to be 
(Kaufman, 2005).  
 Efficiency is a crucial objective since the maintenance and advancement of the 
human condition is clearly promoted from attaining as much output as is possible from 
society’s limited resources. Thus, Commons states (IE, p. 6) “It is for this reason of 
scarcity that I make efficiency a universal principle.”  
 But Commons goes on to expand the objectives of economic policy to include 
two other normative goals: equity (social justice) and human self-development and self-
realization. As noted above, Commons believed a reasonable level of equity promotes 
efficiency and thus the two are in substantial part complements. But quite apart from any 
efficiency consideration, Commons argued that reasonable fairness/social justice should 
also be pursued as an explicit welfare goal on account of its intrinsic ethical value. He 
notes in IE (p. 706), for example, that equality is one of the “fundamental wishes of all 
mankind,” while elsewhere Commons observes that the public accepts free trade only as 
long as it is also fair trade (IE, p. 63)     
  The highest-order welfare goal in Commons’ social welfare function is that the 
economy be structured and operated so as to promote maximum opportunities for 
personal growth and development. His teacher and mentor Richard Ely (1938, p. 66) 
stated this idea with the dictum that the end goal of economic activity is “the true growth 
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of all mankind; namely, the full and harmonious development in each individual of all 
human faculties,” a theme Commons echoes with the statement that the end goal is “[to] 
gradually develop all that is highest in every son of man” (quoted in Gonce, 1996).  
 In effect, Commons subscribes to the Biblical instruction that “man does not 
live by bread alone” and an economy should thus be judged in terms of a broader array of 
criteria than just efficiency. In modern terms, the social welfare function of institutional 
economics can be thought of as a quasi-lexicographic version of Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs – that is, the neoclassical objective of maximum efficiency is the first order (or 
bottom level) need that is given first priority but then arrayed in an ascending quasi-
lexicographic ordering are other higher level objectives, such as equity and self-
realization (Lutz and Lux, 1988; Kaufman, 1990).  
  
Conclusion  
 A common perception is that institutional economics lacks theory and therefore 
only one kind of economics exists – neoclassical economics. The purpose of this paper 
has been to demonstrate that both conclusions need substantial revision. Drawing on the 
work of  John R. Commons, I endeavor to delineate the core theoretical and 
methodological principles of institutional economics – or at least his version and as I 
interpret and synthesize it, and illustrate the connections between institutional economics 
and other fields such as economic sociology. My claim is that Commons’ writings, along 
with contributions from other institutional and heterodox economists – including a 
number of recent Nobel Prize winners (Schmid, 2001), not only yield theory and testable 
hypotheses but also provide the basis for an alternative heterodox paradigm in economics 
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with a distinctive body of microeconomic and macroeconomic theory. I make no claim to 
have fully developed this paradigm or body of theory, but I do believe this paper has 
usefully outlined and described its essential premises and principles. On one hand, not 
everyone will agree with these distinctions and boundary lines; on the other, they are put 
forward with credible logic and supporting evidence.  
 The true test of a theory is that it yields interesting, useful, and empirically 
falsifiable predictions. The key concepts of institutional economics are bounded 
rationality, property rights, working rules, institutions, and the transaction and its most 
important working principles are positive transaction cost and incomplete contracts. With 
these, numerous implications and predictions concerning labor markets, labor outcomes 
and the employment relationship can be generated. Institutional economics, for example, 
provides a theoretical explanation for the existence of an employment relationship and 
endogenizes the boundary between firms and labor markets, thus providing a theoretical 
base for industrial relations (i.e., the study of the employment relationship) as a separate 
field in the social sciences (Kaufman, 2004c). Likewise, institutional economics suggests 
that rules and institutions structure external and internal labor markets and employment 
outcomes, thus making industrial relations an integral part of the study of labor 
economics as long maintained by earlier institutional and neo-institutional labor 
economists (Reynolds, 1950; Kerr, 1954; Dunlop, 1958). Regarding neoclassical labor 
economics, institutional theory demonstrates that the perfectly competitive labor market 
model is theoretically contradictory; explains the origin and consequences of principal-
agent, moral hazard, adverse selection and numerous other contracting problems in 
employment; predicts that labor markets are not self-correcting, wage rates are neither 
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flexible nor fully compensating, firms’ labor demand may not decline with a rise in wage 
rates, efficiency is related to fairness, firms in many cases have a power advantage over 
individual workers, and unions and government labor laws may increase (as well as 
decrease) economic efficiency. These insights give further credence to the observation of 
Streeck (2005, p. 255) that “free labor markets are impossible, and unregulated labor 
markets are neither free nor fair.” 
 Of course, some (perhaps many) mainstream economists will argue that all of 
these predictions can also be explained with some generalized version of neoclassical 
economic theory (Becker, 1976; Boyer and Smith, 2001). The challenge faced with this 
argument, however, is to demonstrate how this expanded/amended theory escapes the 
twin charges that it is fundamentally ad hoc relative to the Walrasian competitive core of 
the paradigm and in contradiction of the paradigm’s most celebrated theoretical insight – 
the Invisible Hand Theorem (Amable, Boyer, and Lordon, 1997). Neoclassical theory 
cannot explain everything and avoid tautology or ex post rationalization, hence opening 
up intellectual space and scientific need for an alternative heterodox paradigm. What I 
hope to have demonstrated is that the theoretical writings of John R. Commons provide 
many of the core ideas and concepts for such an alternative paradigm, and the basis for a 
stronger integration of the economic and social dimensions of human behavior.   
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